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The long-run optimality conditions are examined. It will be
shown that input taxes will not achieve them. For the application of
input taxes, a transfer payment is necessary. The optimal tax
schemes are derived under imperfect monitoring. A pure emission
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Keywords: Emission Regulation, Imperfect Monitoring, Long Run Optimality,
Pigouvian Tax
1. Introduction
Impositions of pigouvian taxes on emissions have been widely accepted
as suitable remedies for externalities. In a word of certainty and perfect
monitoring, pigouvian taxes actually achieve social optimality conditions
by themselves. Neither other type taxes nor transfer payments are neces
sary. These properties are showed by Spulber (1985). On the other hand, in
a world of uncertainty and imperfect monitoring, these properties may not
be hold. For instance, Schmutzler and Goulder (1997) show that the combi
nations of an output tax and an emission tax would derive higher social
welfare in some circumstances.
The purpose of this paper is to extend the analyses of emission regula
tion in a world of uncertainty and imperfect monitoring. We will discuss the
validity of various tax schemes in this framework. More specifically, we will
examine the validity of tax schemes by comparing their consequences with
the long-run optimality conditions. The long-rum optimality conditions are
important issues. It is because appropriate tax schemes in the short-run do
not necessarily achieve the long run optimality conditions. It is possible
appropriate tax schemes in the short run fail to provide correct entry incen-
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tives to the firms. In such circumstances, transfer payments are necessary
to Induce socially optimal entry (see Carlson and Loury 1980).
The paper Is organized as follows. In Section 2, we define a regulator's
problem under perfect monitoring. A regulator's object Is to choose Indus
try output. Inputs, and the number of firms so as to maximize social welfare.
For this purpose, the regulator has to achieve two necessary conditions.
They are the Input combination condition and the entry condition. The
Input combination condition tells whether the firms are using Inputs appro
priately. The entry condition, alternatively, states a necessary adjustment In
a long-run profit condition. To maximize social welfare, both conditions are
necessary. In Section 3, we show emission taxes will achieve both condi
tions but Input taxes will achieve neither of them. In Section 4, we will
extend the above analysis under Imperfect monitoring. We will derive the
Input combination condition and the entry condition under Imperfect moni
toring. In Section 5, the validity of tax schemes will be examined with these
conditions. Then, we will show necessary adjustments for maximizing
social welfare. Section 6 presents conclusions and policy Implications.
2. The Social Optimum under Perfect Monitoring
Although the ultimate object of this paper Is to analyze the social optl-
mallty conditions under Imperfect monitoring, we first Introduce the basic
model under perfect monitoring. The model Introduced here Is the similar
model as Spulber (1985).
There are n Identical firms producing a homogeneous output q. These
firms use Inputs xj given Input prices rj, The firm's production
technology Is characterized by the production function, =
f(X). / Is twice differentlable. Increasing and concave. In the course of pro
duction, firms generate emissions, e, as a by-product. The emission level Is
determined by the pollution function, e = h(xi,- --,XT,i) = h(X). h Is also twice
differentlable. The sign of Its first derivative Is positive but the sign of Its
second derivative Is unknown. Emissions are pollutants and cause social
welfare loss. The reduction of social welfare Is captured by the social dam
age function oi D{E) where E=ne. The social damage function Is assumed
to be differentlable dD{E)/dE=D'(E)=D'(ne)>0 and D(0) = 0.
The regulator's problem Is to choose the Industry output, emission.
Inputs, and the number of firms so as to maximize social welfare subject to
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the technological constraints. Let P(*) be the inverse demand function and
F be a fixed cost. Then, the Lagrangian for the regulator is
nq
L = JP{s)ds - n^TjXj - nF-D{ne) + n^{f{X) -q) + nS(e- h(X)) {1)
0  j=i
where ^  and S are the shadow prices for the production and emission con
straints, respectively. The first-order necessary conditions include
dq
de
P(nq)-^ = 0 (2)
-D'{ne)+5^Q (3)
dL , .df(X) ^dh{X) . . ,
—: + (5—^ = 0 (4)
dXj dXj dXj
P(nq)q-^rjXj-F-D'(ne)e = 0. (5)
dn ,.=1
Denote the optimal allocation and shadow prices (q*, X*, e*, n*, S*). Then,
combining the first-order conditions, q=f(X) and e = h(X), we will have the
optimality condition of the input combinations.
df(X*) , dh(X*) . ,P(nq)^—- = rj + D(ne)— j=l, (6)
C/OCj
The marginal revenue product of each input should equal the marginal fac
tor cost to society, the sum of the input price and the social damage in pro
duction activity. As Spulber pointed out, the principal optimality conditions
are (5) and (6). The first-order condition (6) is the input combination condi
tion. Once the appropriate input combination is chosen, both the output
and emission levels are automatically optimized. Therefore, the first-order
condition (6) will suffice for (3) and (4). The first-order condition (5) is the
long-run entry condition. The number of firms in the industry must be deter
mined after subtracting the social damage of emissions from the zero profit
condition.
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3. Regulation Under Perfect Monitoring
Emission Tax
If the firm behaves in a competitive manner, the firm takes output price,
P, as given. Then, the Lagrangian for the firm's problem becomes
m
i = Fq- -F-tee + X(f{X) -q) + <7(e - h{X)) (7)
j=i
where te is an emission tax. X and a are the shadow prices for the produc
tion and effluent constraints, respectively. The first-order necessary condi
tions include
Ml
dq
P-X = Q (8)
—— —te + <7 — Q (9)
de
dL . dh{X) n • ,
—: -Tj+X ' -CT ' ' = 0 (10)
doCj j
Combining the first-order necessary conditions, we will have the firm's
input combination conditions.
=  3=1, (11)
, .dh{X)
dXj ^ ^ dxj
Setting the emission tax tl = D'{rCe*), the input combination conditions of
equation (6) will be achieved. The optimal emission tax induces the firm to
choose the appropriate input combination. With the emission tax =
Z)'(nV), the total tax payment will be D'{n*e*)e*. It will achieve the correct
entry condition of equation (5).
Input Taxes
As we have seen, emission taxes will achieve both the input combina
tion condition and the entry condition. Can we derive the same optimality
conditions with other tax schemes? Spulber showed that output taxes
would not achieve the optimality conditions. In this section, we will show
that input taxes will not achieve the optimality conditions, either.
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Denote the input taxes tj, m. Then, the firm's short-run profit
maximization problem is
m
Max = Pf{X) - ^(1 + tj)rjXj. (12)
7=1
The first-order conditions for the firm is then
.dnx)
Thus, the firm chooses the input combination so as to satisfy
= + (13)
df(X)/3xi ri+tiVi
df(X)/dxi n + tin' (14)
From equation (6), the appropriate input combination conditions need to
satisfy
r,+Z) W)( W)/A,)
ifixy^x, n + D'(n'eWmyiK) '
Therefore, in order to induce the firm to adopt the appropriate input combi
nations, the regulator needs to set the input taxes to its social damage,
/:, = -Z)'(nV)^^ (16)
Vj dxj
For this purpose, the regulator requires the knowledge about pollution pro
ductions of all firms. However, such knowledge is unlikely obtained.
PROPOSITION 1. In order to derive the optimal input combination condi
tion, the regulator has to know a pollution generation mechanism of each
firm. Unless the regulator has the knowledge, the optimal input combina
tion conditions can not be obtained.
When the regulator imposes input taxes, he or she rarely imposes input
taxes on all inputs. In general, the regulator imposes inputs taxes only on
several inputs. Here, we will see whether the regulator can achieve the
social optimality conditions with such a partial input tax scheme. For the
simplicity, suppose the firm uses only two inputs in the production and the
regulator imposes an input tax on one of the two inputs. In order to induce
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the firm to choose the appropriate input combination, the regulator has to
adjust the input tax of t\ to the level
d,mydx2 r2 + D'(n*eWh{X*)/dx2) . rz
df(X*)/dxi n + D'(n*eWh(X*)/dxi) n + hn'
1  ^hlX*)
To satisfy the above condition, ti<—D'(n*e*)— However, in order to
n  dxi
reduce the amount of emissions to the socially optimal level, the regulator
has to raise the rate of h. It requires h > —D'{n*e*) ^. Clearly, these two
ri oxi
conditions are not satisfied simultaneously. Hence, the social optimality
conditions will not be achieved with a partial input tax scheme.
PROPOSITION 2. The social optimality conditions will not be achieved
with a partial input tax scheme.
1  dh(X*)With the optimal input tax scheme, tj= —D'(n*e*)—^—
Then, the entry condition becomes ^ ^
Pf(X*) -F- %rjXj^ - D'(n*F) X
j=i j-i
ah(x*)
dXj xr=o. (17)
171 n jU /
If the pollution function, h{X) is homogeneous of degree one, —%=
j=i dXj
h(X) = e. Then, the entry condition will be identical with equation (5),
m
PfiX*) - F- J^rjxf - D'(n*e*)e* = 0. (18)
i=i
Otherwise, the optimal input tax scheme alone cannot induce the optimal
entry condition. Thus, a transfer payment is necessary for the long-run opti
mality.
In the case of a single input with the optimal input tax, the entry condi
tion is
P(nq)f{X) - nxi-F-D'(ne)^^^xi = 0.
C/Xi
To provide correct entry incentives to the firms, the entry equation has to be
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P(n*q*)f(xi)-riXi -F-D'(n*e*)e* = 0.
To satisfy this requirement, a lump-sum tax (or subsidy) per firm is required
r=
X* dxi
Xi. (19)
If the pollution function of h{xi) is globally convex, the sign of the square
bracket is negative. Hence a lump-sum subsidy is required. On the con
trary, if the pollution function of h(xi) is globally concave, the sign of the
square bracket is positive, a lump-sum tax is required.
Figure 1 shows the above argument. If the pollution function is globally
convex (hxixt>0), the slope of the pollution function (marginal product
dhx^dxi) is always larger than the slope of a ray from the origin (average
product h(x\)/x\). In this case, the social damage of input will be over-esti
mated and the total tax bill paid by individual firms may be too large.
Hence, a lump-sum subsidy is required. On the other hand, if the pollution
function is globally concave (/ii:|3:|<0), the slope of the pollution function,
dhxjdxi, is always smaller than the slope of a ray from the origin, h{x\)/x\.
In this case, the social damage of input will be under-estimated and the
total tax bill paid by individual firms may be too small. However, in gen
eral, we do not know the shape of the pollution functions and cannot
examine the necessary transfer mechanism.
Figure 1 Input Tax and Required Transfer
h(xi)
<0 V^i => dh(x\)/dx\ < h(x\)/x\ Tax
hx\:r^ >0 yx\ => dh(x\)/dx\ > h(x\)/x\ => Subsidy
! /i,, , > 0
'  Tlryr, <0
X\ X\
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PROPOSITION 3. For a single input with free entry firms, the entry condi
tion will not be achieved with an input tax. A transfer payment is required
to adjust the difference between the marginal private cost and the average
private cost of pollution.
In this section, we evaluate an emission tax and Input taxes based on
the social optlmallty conditions: the Input combination condition and the
entry condition. We showed that the emission tax would satisfy both the
Input combination condition and the entry condition. Therefore, the social
optlmallty can be achieved with the emission tax. On the other hand. Input
taxes satisfy neither the Input combination condition nor the entry condi
tion. Therefore, the social optlmallty cannot be achieved with Input taxes. In
the next section, we will extend our analysis to the case under Imperfect
monitoring.
4. The Social Optimum Under Imperfect Monitoring
The regulator often does some monitoring activities for examining the
emission level. These activities Include establishments of monitoring sta
tions, occasional Inspections to the firms, and a system of finest In the rest
of this paper, we assume these types of activities are mandatory for the
regulator to Induce the firms to change their behavior and the regulator has
to spend some monitoring cost for these activities.
The regulator's problem Is to choose Industry output, emission. Inputs,
and the number of firms to maximize social welfare subject to technologi
cal constraints and monitoring methods available. The Lagranglan for the
regulator Is
nq m.
P(s)ds-n^rjXj-nF-D{ne)-M(n,q,e)+n^{f(X)-q)-\-n5{e-h(X)) (20)
0  j=\
where M Is the minimum monitoring costs needed to Induce the emission
level e and the output level q with the number of firms n. It Is assumed that
dM(n,q,e)/dn>Q), dM(n,q,e)/dq>0, and dM(n,q,e)/de<0. The first Inequality
means that a necessary monitoring cost becomes larger as the number
1. See Hardford (1978), Malik (1990), and Swierzbinski (1994). For the summary of discussions, see
Cropper and Gates (1992) and Batthold (1994).
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of firms Increases. For instance, a monitoring cost for spot-check to the fac
tories becomes larger as the number of firms increases. The second ine
quality means that a monitoring cost becomes larger as the output level
increases. For instance, the regulator needs to examine outputs produced
if toxic materials are contained in outputs. In such a circumstance, a nec
essary monitoring cost will increase as the output level increases. The
third inequality means a necessary monitoring cost becomes smaller as the
emission level increases. For instance, the regulator may need not to use
sophisticated devices to detect a large amount of pollution. In such a cir
cumstance, a necessary monitoring cost becomes smaller as the emission
level increases.
Figure 2 shows the relationships among a number of firms n, an output
level q, an emission level e, and a necessary monitoring cost M. Given the
number of firms rf and the output level q^, the necessary monitoring cost
to achieve the emission level, e°, is (See point A.) The necessary mon
itoring cost to achieve the same emission level would increase as the output
level increases. For example, if the output level becomes 9', the necessary
monitoring cost will be OM' with the same number of firms ^2 = %". (It corre
sponds to the movement from point A to point B.) Under a certain level of
output, the smaller the emission level, the larger the necessary monitoring
cost would be. For example, the necessary monitoring cost to achieve the
Figure 2 Monitoring Cost and Its Determinants
e''(M=n")
{n=n'')
(n=n^)
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emission level e' where e^<e^ will be OM- when the output level is 5" and
the number of firms is nP. (Compare point C with point A). Changing the
number of firms also has an impact on the necessary monitoring cost. As
the number of firms increases, monitoring cost functions will shift outward.
For example, if the number of firms becomes n\ the necessary monitoring
cost to achieve the emission level would be given the output level
q^. It implies the increase of the necessary monitoring cost. (See point D.)
From the first-order necessary conditions of (20),
Ml.
n  dq
M:
de n de
dxj dXj dXj m
P{nq)q-^rjXj-F-D'(ne)e- =o_
uTl OTl
(21)
(22)
(23)
(24)
Denote the optimum allocation and shadow prices {<f, X*, e*, n*, 1^*, S*).
Then, combining the first-order necessary conditions, q=fiX), and e = h(X),
we will have the optimal input combination conditions under imperfect
monitoring.
P(nY)
1 dM(n*,q:e*)
n dq
df{X')
dXj = rj + D'{n*e*) +
1 dM{n*,q:el
n de
dh(Xn
dxj
(25)
Equation (25) contains two aspects. First, the use of additional input raises
the output level. Then, the larger the output level, the larger the monitoring
cost will be. The first square bracket in (25) reflects the increase of the
monitoring cost, (l/n*)dM(n*,q*e'')/dq. The marginal factor benefit to society
has to be evaluated after subtracting the increase of the monitoring cost
from the output price.
Second, the marginal factor cost to society has to include the reduction
of the monitoring cost through the emission expansion. The increase of
emissions raises the social damage, D'(n*e*). However, it reduces the neces-
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sary monitoring cost, dM{rC,q*e*)/de. The second square bracket in (25) con
tains these two counter effects.
The required adjustments in the input combination condition depend
on the selection of the monitoring methods. If the regulator decides moni
toring only outputs and the monitoring cost will not be influenced by the
emission level, dM(n*,q*e*)/de = 0. Then, the marginal factor cost to society
will be reduced to rj+D'(rte*)-dh{x*)/dxj,j= Alternatively, if the reg
ulator decides monitoring only emissions and the monitoring cost will not
be influenced by the output level, dM(n*q*e*)/dq = 0. Then, the marginal fac
tor benefit to society will be the marginal revenue product of each input,
P{n*q*)-df{Xy3xj,j=l,.-;m.
The nature of the pollution generations and the availability of monitor
ing methods determine the selection of the monitoring method. Although
the selection of monitoring methods is an interesting and important research
agenda, we want to keep it beyond the scope of this present discussion.
Rather than discussing the selection of monitoring method, we will simply
assume that monitoring activities are mandatory and incur some costs.
Consider the entry condition of (24). If the monitoring cost does not
depend on the number of firms in the industry, dM(n,q,e)/dn=0, the entry
condition of (24) becomes identical with (5). Further, if the number of firms
is large enough, the input combination conditions of (25) will be reduced to
(6). It means that the effect of the firm's production choices have only trivial
effect on the monitoring cost.
If the monitoring cost increases in proportion to the total output level Q
and total input level E, the monitoring cost will be M{n,q,e)=M(nq,ne) =
M{Q,E). The input combination conditions of (25) will be
dQ dxj ' oE
dHX*)
dXj
The number of firms in the industry will not influence the optimal input
combination.
When the growth rate of the monitoring cost is an increasing function
of the number of firms, the regulator has to do cumbersome works. In par
ticular, the regulator has to vary tax rates with the number of firms in the
industry (see equation (25)). When the number of firms is large, the
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increase of the monitoring cost through the output expansion should be
relatively small. Hence, a relatively small adjustment is enough. On the
contrary, when the number of firms is small, the increase of the monitoring
cost through the output expansion would be large. Hence, a relatively large
adjustment is required. The regulator has to do a similar kind of job for the
adjustment of the second square bracket in equation (25).
5. Regulation Under Imperfect Monitoring
To discuss the validity of tax schemes, we have to assume how firms
behave under imperfect monitoring. For conclusive analysis of these topics,
we need to adopt principal-agent approaches. However, applications of these
approaches will be beyond the scope of this paper. In this paper, we adopt
the Harford model and simply assume that the firm will behave as if there
was no emission tax without any monitoring cost (see Harford 1978 and
Schmutzler and Goulder 1997). Denote actual emissions e and undeclared
emissions e„ where e„e[0,e], respectively. The firm's problem is to choose
output, emission, undeclared emission, and inputs so as to maximize the
(expected) profit subject to technological constraints. The Lagrangian for
the firm is
m
l = Pq- YjjXj-F- teie- e„)-z(e„M)- A(f(X)-g) + o(e-h(X)) (26)
j=i
where z(ey,M) is the expected penalty fine given the monitoring expense
M. When the regulator spends a large amount of money for the monitoring
activities, the firm faces a higher probability of paying a penalty fine. Hence,
the larger the monitoring expense, the smaller undeclared emissions will
be. The first-order necessary conditions include
—: P-A = 0 (27)
dq
de
-te + (J = 0 (28)
te- (29)
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di , ,df(X) dHX) ^ . ,
—: -rj + A-4;^-CT ' -0 (30)
doCj
The relationship (29) tells us the firm chooses the level of undeclared emis
sions so that the expected marginal penalty fine equals the emission tax.
We assume that the regulator applies such a fine system with the monitor
ing costM^.
Combining the first-order conditions, we have the input combination
condition,
(31)
doCj
By comparing equation (31) with equation (25), we can discuss the limita
tions of pigouvian taxes as a remedy for externalities. First, the input com
bination conditions will not be achieved with a pure emission tax. It is
because the marginal factor benefit will not be adjusted to the socially opti
mal level by emission taxes. As long as the monitoring cost depends on
the output level, we require some adjustment mechanisms so as to sub
tract the increase of the monitoring cost, (\/rC)(dM{rC,q'',e*)/dq), from the out
put price, P(n*q*).
An output tax can be used for this purpose. Defining to as an output tax
and solving the firm's maximization problem, we will have the input com
bination condition.
(P-to)^^ = rj+te^^ (32).  n dh(X)dxj ^ dxj
Setting the output tax t''o=(\/rC){dM(rC,q*e*)/dq) and the emission tax t*e =
D'{n*e*) + (l/n*)(dM(n*,q*e*)/de), the input combination condition of (25) will
be achieved.
PROPOSITION 4. If a monitoring cost depends on the output level, a pure
emission tax will not achieve the input combination condition. The input
combination condition will be achieved with a mixed tax.
2. When the equality is not hold, we will have corner solutions. If tr<dz{e,„M)/de„, the firm never pays
emission taxes. Paying penalty fees is a cheaper option for the firm. Hence, e = e„ and the emission
tax revenue is zero. If tr>dz{e,„M)/de„, the firm declares the full amount of emissions. Paying emis
sion taxes is a cheaper option for the firm. Hence, e„ = 0 and the penalty fine is zero.
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To provide correct entry Incentives to the firms, the long-run entry condi
tion (24) needs to be satisfied. For examining the long-run entry condition in
a simple framework, we assume that the monitoring cost depends on total
output and total emission. Under this condition, M(n,q,e)=M(nq,ne) =
M(Q,E). Then, the optimal output tax is tl={dM(Q*E*)/dQ) and the optimal
emission tax is tl=D'(E*) + (dM(Q*E*)/dE), respectively. The sum of total
tax bill and penalty fine paid by individual firms is tlq + t*e(e-ej,) + z(eu,M).
On the other hand, the necessary adjustment is tlq+tle (see equation (24)).
This is the amount of money to be subtracted from the long-run zero profit
condition. Clearly, the firms incur appropriate costs when tleu = z(el,M*). It
requires that the emission tax coincides with the (expected) penalty fine
and dz(e*u,M*)/deu=z(e'u,M'')/el from equation (29). When this condition is
satisfied, it does not matter whether the firms honestly reports their emis
sions or not. Anyhow, the same amount of money will be collected as
penalty fines. To hold this equality for all range of e„, an expected penalty
fine of z{ey,M) has to be a linear function of e„.
When the above equality is not satisfied, a lump-sum tax (or subsidy).
T=
z(el,M*)
e„
dz{el,M*)
dSu 6u
is necessary to achieve the optimal entry condition. It is because the firm
actually pays z(el,M') although it needs to pay 3z(el,M*)/deyel as a penalty
fine.
PROPOSITION 5. If a firm can choose the level of undeclared emissions,
the entry condition will not be achieved with pigouvian taxes. A transfer
payment is required in order to adjust an expected penalty fine to the social
damage of undeclared emissions.
Suppose a firm has to pay a penalty fine of ae,, when the regulator
detects he or she is cheating, a is a penalty fine per emission. If a probabil
ity detected by the regulator is a function of the level of undeclared emis
sions and the monitoring expense, an expected penalty fine is s(e„,M) =
K(eu,M)aeu. When input combination conditions are satisfied, the expected
penalty fine paid by an individual firm is z{e*„M*) = 7t(ey,M)aeu. On the
contrary, the actual social damage of undeclared emissions is dz(e*u,M)/
denel = dn(el,M*)/deua(elf + n:(el,M)aeu. Clearly, the expected penalty fine
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is smaller than the social damage of undeclared emissions and a lump-
sum tax of T = dn(el,M*)/de„a(el)'^ is necessary to achieve the appropriate
entry condition.
An implication of this result is as follows. By choosing pigouvian taxes
to the short-run optimal level, the regulator can achieve the input combina
tion condition. Then, he or she will succeed to induce the firm to choose
the social optimal output and emission. However, it does not necessarily
mean the regulator simultaneously achieves the long-run condition. Even if
pigouvian taxes are appropriately imposed, the firms are able to avoid pay
ing their social costs by under-reporting their emissions. To achieve the
entry condition, a lump-sum tax is necessary.
6. Conclusion and Policy Implication
In this paper, we discussed emission regulation and long-run optimal
ly. To derive long-run optimality, the regulator has to achieve two condi
tions. Those are the input combination condition and the entry condition.
Based on these two conditions, we evaluated various emission regulations.
Some of the results in this paper might be useful for the design of emission
regulations.
First, input taxes achieve neither the input combination condition nor
the entry condition. Unless imposing input taxes on all inputs, the social
optimal condition will not be obtained. Imposing input taxes on selected
inputs create distortions in the allocation of resources. Further, for the appli
cation of input taxes, a transfer payment is necessary. Without a transfer
payment, the regulator cannot provide correct entry incentives to the firms.
Second, under imperfect monitoring, a pure emission tax unlikely
obtains the social optimality conditions. A monitoring cost will increase as
the output level increases. This monitoring cost has to be subtracted from
the marginal social benefit of output. However, the regulator cannot do this
job alone with emission taxes. An introduction of an output tax can solve
this problem.
Third, a transfer payment is necessary to achieve the long-run entry
condition under imperfect monitoring. Even if the regulator succeeds to
choose the optimal tax rates, the long-run entry condition may not be
obtained. Only when the expected penalty fine equals the actual social
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damage of undeclared emissions, the long-run entry condition is satisfied.
Otherwise, the regulator has to use a transfer payment.
(Assistant Professor, Dept of Economics)
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